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Abstract. Certain ontology and epistemology perspectives are most relevant to human systems’ enquiry. These are derived
from a synergy of insights from theories of autopoiesis, interpersonal neurobiology and complexity. Ontology has implications
for our comprehension of the nature of human systems: 1/ Human systems are embodied and situated, exhibiting self-
organising and emergent properties; 2/ Human experience is personal but not private, it is born in the interactions with
the environment, and is validated by the human structure; 3/ Changes in human structure are necessarily subservient to
conservation of autopoiesis, i.e. self-production and maintaining life. The epistemological implications deem ontology and
epistemology as mutually informative in human enquiry; the thrust of this article. Our knowledge is limited by our capabilities
of awareness. The quality of perception interlinks with cultivating awareness and intentionality for maintaining wellbeing,
i.e. sustaining life-enhancing conditions. The concept of ‘wellbeing informatics’ is used to outline a tangible approach to
evaluating wellbeing.
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Dr Rauch is a neurobiologist. He50
examines the neural correlates of51
low intensity physical activity (based52
on natural movement principles) and53
biofeedback as a means of combatting54
ANS dysregulation to improve health55
and wellbeing. The same natural56
movement principles are also effec-57
tive in improving performances on58
the sports field and in the workplace.59
Two crucial aspects of ANS dysregu-60
lation that needs to be optimized are:61
neutralizing excessive somatic sym-62
pathetic nerve activations (SNA) and63
enhancing vagal nerve activation of the heart and the viscera.64
Dr. Rauch’s recent research established that heart rate and HRV65
are good markers of SNA and vagal activity, respectively if the66
measurements are done under well controlled conditions.67
1. Introduction68
The purpose of this article is to introduce perspec-69
tives on ontology and epistemology with relevance70
to enquiry, and sense making in human systems.71
The last few decades have seen advancements in sci-72
ence, and trans-disciplinary synergies have rendered73
a shift from a reductionist to a more holistic paradigm74
[21, 22]. New insights have implications for the com-75
prehension of the nature of being human and the76
nature of societal systems. This, in turn, informs epis-77
temology and knowledge creation coherent with the78
ontological perspective. According to the 2017 Stan-79
ford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ontology concerns80
itself with the nature of things and the study of the81
most general features of what there is, and how the82
things, that are relate to each other metaphysically.83
In this article it is used to describe the nature of84
human systems from the perspective of autopoiesis85
[14, 15], the theory of mindsight [24] and complexity86
[2, 4, 9, 12, 17, 16, 19]. Grasp of the nature of ‘being87
human’, with relevance to the physical, mental and88
societal domains in the theory of autopoiesis leads89
to epistemological perspectives that deviate from the90
rationalistic metaphor of knowledge as an objec-91
tive representation of a world outside of the human92
observer [12, 32]. Systems ontology leads to consid-93
ering methods of enquiry and intervention coherent94
with the nature of the system. Ontology and episte-95
mology intertwine into an impacting and developing96
relationship, and are mutually informative in human97
enquiry.98
2. Autopoiesis99
There is a large body of literature by the Chilean100
biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco101
Varela, usually referred to as autopoietic the- 102
ory [14, 15]. The theory describes the nature of 103
living systems and has found far wider applica- 104
tion than may be suggested from its biological 105
roots, thus, generating implications for episte- 106
mology, communication and societal systems 107
theory. 108
Autopoietic theory proposes a generative defini- 109
tion of a living system, i.e. autopoietic system in the 110
physical domain. An autopoietic system is defined 111
as a network of processes of production of com- 112
ponents that produces the components that through 113
their interaction and transformations continuously 114
regenerate the network of processes that produced 115
them, and constitute the entity as a concrete unity in 116
the space by specifying the topological domain of its 117
realisation as such a network [14]. Thus, the internal 118
dynamics of the components (neural nets, metabolic 119
nets, etc.) generate and sustain the global processes 120
of the autopoietic entity. At the same time, however, 121
the global processes (behaviour, consciousness, 122
mind) constrain and govern the interactions and the 123
state of the individual components. This dialectic 124
relationship between local and global levels is 125
described in autopoietic theory as ‘reciprocal’ [14]. 126
For example, in organisms with a nervous system, 127
the rules of interactions within the neural network 128
are in reciprocal relationship with the overall activity 129
of the living entity. To a very large extent, behaviour 130
is a regulator of perception [30, 31], i.e. what the 131
organism senses is a function of how it behaves 132
and of its state of being, and how it is and how it 133
behaves, is a function of what it senses. ‘Situated 134
behaviour’, thus, takes the form of coupling with 135
the environment; where environmental perturbations 136
trigger changes in the entity but do not determine 137
them, because changes in living systems are nec- 138
essarily subservient to conservation of autopoiesis 139
[14, 15]. The observer is in a position to distinguish 140
the structure of a living system and the structure of 141
the environment, and, observe them both changing 142
in their mutual interaction. The important thing is 143
that both the system and the environment undergo 144
transformations through the process of coupling, 145
referred to as ‘structural coupling’, and these trans- 146
formations are determined by the structure of the 147
transformed entity and not only by the perturbation. 148
In autopoietic (living) entities with a nervous system, 149
the coupling with the environment constrains and 150
governs the neural dynamics. Thus, it is clear that 151
the mode of coupling with the environment has two 152
complementary dimensions: First, the living entity 153
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depends on its environment and defines itself through154
the interactions with that environment (these interac-155
tions are of the nature of macro-physical encounters156
such as sensory transduction or muscle movements);157
Second, yet no less important, coupling is only possi-158
ble because these encounters are embraced from the159
perspective of the global processes (mind, conscious-160
ness, behaviour) produced by the internal dynamics161
of the autopietic system. This action appears to the162
observer as an ongoing cognitive activity, and the163
living organism exhibits the properties of a cognitive164
self [14].165
The dialectics of living organisms are based on166
the necessary emergence of a meaning proper to the167
perspective of the cognitive self (for example one’s168
perception), and on a coupling with the environ-169
ment which refers to the necessary dependence of the170
self on its environment (for example socio-linguistic171
interactions). Consequently, the contents of human172
experience depend crucially on the mutual embed-173
dedness of the neural dynamics (embedded in the174
overall physical and chemical dynamics), the human175
agent as a unity with global processes (behaviour,176
mind, consciousness) and the environment. Thus,177
human experience is personal but not private. Expe-178
rience is clearly a personal event, but that does not179
mean it is private, in the sense of some kind of180
isolated subject that is parachuted down onto a pre181
given objective world [30]. It appears more appro-182
priate to view personal experience as ‘ripples on183
the common ocean’. An investigation of the struc-184
ture of human experience inevitably induces a shift185
towards a consideration that several levels of con-186
sciousness become inextricably linked to those of187
others and to the phenomenal world in an emphatic188
mesh [31]. The irreducibility of human experience189
cannot be underestimated when developing research190
approaches or methodologies [11, 12]. Human expe-191
rience represents an irreducible first-person ontology192
[28]. It is not sufficient to explain experience by193
assuming a third person or objective viewpoint. What194
is required is to recognise that both first-person and195
third person accounts, and their interplay, are neces-196
sary in order to do justice to the quality of enquiry197
[22, 29].198
An autopoietic ontology suggests: the human expe-199
rience is validated in a special way by the human200
structure, and this shapes the entity that arises in the201
description [14, 15]. This ontological perspective has202
impact on epistemology, i.e. it challenges the frag-203
mented world view of an observer separate from the204
observed reality.
3. Linguistic interactions, language and 205
complexity in human organisations 206
An organism can enter into structural coupling 207
with other organisms, and if the interacting organisms 208
reciprocally select in each other their respective paths 209
of ontogenic structural changes, then they generate a 210
domain of communicative interactions. The individ- 211
ual ontogenies of the participating organisms occur as 212
part of the network of co-ontogenies that they bring 213
about in constituting societal unities. The observer 214
designates as communicative those behaviours which 215
occur in societal coupling, and, as communication 216
that behavioural co-ordination he observes as a result. 217
This consensual domain of communicative interac- 218
tions in which the behaviourally coupled organisms 219
orient each other with modes of behaviour, whose 220
internal determination has become specified dur- 221
ing their coupled ontogenies, is a linguistic domain. 222
The name ‘linguistic domain’ was chosen because 223
such learned communicative behaviours constitute 224
the basis for language, although they are not iden- 225
tical with it [14]. The conduct of each organism 226
is internally determined by its autopoietic structure. 227
However, the conduct of one organism is a source of 228
perturbations for the others while the coupling lasts. 229
The linguistic domain, therefore, is intrinsically non- 230
informative, although the observer may describe it 231
as if it were so. What determines the interaction, is 232
the dynamics of structural coupling of the interacting 233
organisms [14, 30]. 234
Such a view contradicts the more traditionally 235
established metaphor of ‘the transmission of informa- 236
tion’, in which communication represents something 237
which is generated at a certain point and carried 238
through an information channel, or conduit, and 239
delivered to a receiver. This metaphor is not correct, 240
since biologically there is no transmitted information 241
[14]. Moreover, it presupposes that what happens to 242
the receiver (listener) is predetermined only by the 243
perturbing agent. In actual fact, however, commu- 244
nication depends not only on what is transmitted, 245
but what happens in the organism that receives it. 246
Communication, therefore, is a matter of mutual 247
orientation, primarily with respect to each other’s 248
behaviour, and secondarily with respect to some 249
subject [7]. 250
To an observer, linguistic co-ordinations of actions 251
appear as distinctions, linguistic distinctions. They 252
describe objects in the environment of those who 253
operate in a linguistic domain. Thus, when an 254
observer operates in a linguistic domain, he operates 255
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in the domain of descriptions. Moreover, language256
as a phenomenon takes place in the recursion of257
linguistic interactions – linguistic co-ordinations258
of linguistic co-ordinations of actions. Therefore,259
the linguistic domain becomes part of the environ-260
ment in which linguistic co-ordination of actions261
take place, and language appears to an observer as a262
domain of descriptions of descriptions. But what an263
observer does is this - he makes linguistic distinctions264
of linguistic distinctions, or what another observer265
would say are ontogenically generated descriptions266
of descriptions [14]. With language arises also the267
observer as a languaging entity; by operating in lan-268
guage with other observers, this entity generates the269
self and its circumstances as linguistic distinctions270
of its participation in a linguistic domain. In this271
way meaning arises as a relationship of linguistic272
distinctions [14].273
Language cannot be regarded as a system of sym-274
bols that stand for things in the world, and thus reveal275
our ‘objective’ knowledge of it. Words are tokens276
for linguistic co-ordination of actions. Therefore, it277
is appropriate to discuss languaging as a venue for278
action rather than language as a symbolic notation.279
Human organisations exist, for their members, in co-280
creating reality where language agreements decide281
what is true and what is false. This is not an agree-282
ment in opinions but in form of life. The key point283
is that by languaging together, the behavioural co-284
ordination, which is language, brings forth a world.285
Language allows for limitless recursion in the cou-286
pling of behavioural capabilities of individuals with287
the changes in societal life they generate [14].288
If language is used to promote the status-quo or one289
way or other reinforce a specific worldview, then it290
can lead to pathological organisational life, where the291
individual members are ‘enslaved’ to support and act292
in organisational processes that they have no access293
to change. Such organisations, deliberately or not,294
use language as a repressive tool to shape human295
experience, and because of this, the creative potential296
of exploring and developing human experience into297
alternative language and practices is lost [15].298
A simple pragmatic alternative is to respect human299
experience. What is required is to foster an environ-300
ment where awareness and attentiveness, are actively301
developed, and where, conversations encourage new302
linguistic distinctions based on new experiences, to303
emerge. Practices like dialogue become essential in304
organisational conversations. The basic requirement305
of dialogue is to be able to talk while suspending opin-306
ions, while neither suppressing them nor insisting307
upon them, not trying to convince but simply to under- 308
stand, without having to say who is right or wrong [3]. 309
This type of communication, enhances awareness of 310
what there is to be heard, without focusing it through 311
the lenses of preconceptions and creates a new frame 312
of mind in which there is a common (or organisa- 313
tional) consciousness: a new kind of intelligence. 314
The dialogue process is to be seen as a core element 315
within any human enterprise, as it creates the context 316
for all activities, rather than (as may be suggested by 317
more traditional communication approaches) being 318
merely part of the chain of activities. Dialogue is 319
about involvement, about co-creation. Thus, a gener- 320
ative dialogue process in organisations will enhance 321
their ability to develop a meaningful language, a valid 322
venue for action and continuous learning. 323
The phenomenal domain of human organisations 324
is realised through the network of linguistic interac- 325
tions. Stacey, in interpreting the impact of complexity 326
theory on management paradigms, argues that such 327
networks through local agent interactions are capa- 328
ble of spontaneous self-organisation, to produce 329
emergent, evolving patterns of behaviours of the 330
network without any prior comprehensive, system- 331
wide blueprint for evolution [27]. The dynamics 332
are determined by the pattern and nature of the 333
actor’s relationships and linguistic interactions, and 334
the response to any perturbation is determined by 335
these very dynamics. Stabilising the behaviour of the 336
network means simply repeating the past. Dialogue 337
allows for emergence of new meaning and desta- 338
bilises the status-quo, the network conducts itself 339
as a complex adaptive system, i.e. rapidly generat- 340
ing emergent behaviours in response to perturbations 341
[21]. This is what Maturana and Varela define as 342
learning [14]. The flexibility to learn and innovate is 343
essential. Operating in the complex systems domain, 344
human organisations perceive and respond to the 345
smallest changes in the environment or, indeed, inside 346
themselves. 347
4. Reductionism vs holism 348
Autopoietic theory resonates with the emerging 349
paradigm of holism [23, 24]. There is now a signif- 350
icant body of research that supports the insight that 351
our nervous system, mind and interactions with the 352
environment are all interconnected [5, 11, 13, 18]. 353
The prevailing reductionist paradigm of the twen- 354
tieth century has shaped comprehension of human 355
systems and reality through several assumptions: 356
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Matter is the fundamental building block of the Uni-357
verse; Perceptions are accurate representations of an358
objective reality that exists outside of the human359
observer; Knowledge is absolute and allows to pre-360
dict and thus control nature [4]. This worldview, in361
turn, leads to further conceptions, some of which are:362
The Universe and the things comprising it (includ-363
ing humans), function as machines that could be364
understood through the study of the parts that con-365
stitute them; Humans exist as material bodies and366
thus are separate from each other and from nature;367
Genes determine biology; Language describes an368
‘objective’ world.369
These assumptions and conceptions have370
shaped prevailing attitudes, intentionality, beliefs,371
behaviours and artefacts, thus, the predominance of372
rational thinking, reliance on ‘facts’, and leaving out373
potential invisible influences such as the impact of374
the mind on the body and indeed on the world, the375
possibility of connection between minds, and the376
human tendency for cooperation [1]. This, in turn,377
determines the boundaries of the epistemological378
endeavour and the realm of possible action. It is379
therefore, important to explore the changes in onto-380
logical view informed by contemporary science, i.e.381
moving towards a holistic paradigm of the nature of382
reality. Insights from quantum physics, complexity383
theory, systems biology are informing a view of384
the nature of reality, which encourages profoundly385
different conceptions of the human potential.386
Physics now suggests that energy and matter rep-387
resent one ‘reality’ and need to be studied as part of388
a unified whole [4]. Energy fields exist around and389
within matter. They extend over space and interact390
with themselves and with matter. Thus, everything is391
connected to everything else. The quantum reality of392
entanglement opens the possibility of an instant non-393
local connection transcending time and space. If the394
fields impact physical reality, then further questions395
arise: How do these fields emerge and change? What396
is their observable impact on reality? How could we397
influence them?398
Empirical research in contemporary evolutionary399
biology suggests that human systems are not separate400
from their environment (humans are not mere prod-401
ucts of their genes). It is the environment, matter and402
energy fields that determine how genes unfold and403
manifest into matter [8]. Human minds, i.e. thoughts,404
emotions and intentions, have impact on biological405
embodiment and on the physical environment [8].406
Minds are not simply products of brains, they are407
interconnected in principle everything there is.408
The holistic perspective of reality informs a more 409
complex view of the dimensions of human expe- 410
rience. As argued earlier, autopoiesis explores the 411
mutual emeddedness of the nervous system, mind and 412
interactions with the environment, thus, rendering 413
traditional notions of representation and computa- 414
tion as inadequate [30]. What becomes important, in 415
the study of human experience, is the comprehen- 416
sion of the complex interplay of brain/body, mental 417
activity and world [7], i.e. how we as humans, exam- 418
ine what we live through, how we become aware 419
of our own mental life. Accordingly, an aspect of 420
exploring human experience involves developing and 421
cultivating this basic ability through specific train- 422
ing. A hands-on, non-dogmatic approach can lead to 423
progress. In Varela’s work, this action of ‘becoming 424
aware’ is punctuated by three ‘gestures’: (1) Suspen- 425
sion – a conscious transient suspension of beliefs 426
about the thing being examined; (2) Redirection – 427
turning ones own attention from the object to its 428
source, backwards towards the arising of the thoughts 429
themselves; and, (3) Letting go - changing one’s atti- 430
tude from looking for something to letting it come. 431
5. Awareness and mindsight 432
‘Mindsight’ is a term coined by Daniel Siegel 433
[23, 24] to describe the human capacity to perceive 434
the mind of the self and others. 435
The theory of mindsight defines the mind is an 436
embodied and relational process emerging from the 437
mutual interconnectedness of the physical, mental, 438
and relational (both human and non-human) domains 439
of reality. The mind, as an emergent property, of the 440
body and relationships, is created within the internal 441
neurophysiological processes and relational experi- 442
ences. In other words the mind is a process that 443
emerges from the distributed nervous system, extend- 444
ing throughout the entire body, and also from the 445
communication patterns that occur within relation- 446
ships [24]. To put it simply, relationships and neural 447
linkages together shape the mind [23]. The brain (the 448
embodied nervous system), mind and relationships 449
are aspects of one reality and need to be consid- 450
ered together, where the body provides the biological 451
structure for hosting human experience, and the mind 452
is embodied, and relational process that regulates the 453
information and energy flow in the embodied brain 454
and in the relationships with others and the environ- 455
ment [23]. The term ‘embodied brain’ refers to the 456
whole nervous system, not just the brain in the skull. 457
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The regulation of energy and information flow458
is achieved through the management of intentional-459
ity and attention [24]. Intentionality determines the460
direction of attention. Attention acts like ‘a scalpel’,461
as the direction and scope of attention can trigger462
changes in the brain (neural plasticity) and in the com-463
munication space of relationships and then further464
influence our mental activity, brain and relationships465
in a continuous cycle [27]. The intentionality of ‘see-466
ing reality’ more clearly and continuously enhancing467
awareness and reflection capability requires the inte-468
gration and stabilising of attention in monitoring469
body sensations, mental activity and relationships.470
In Western translation a heightened state of aware-471
ness is often referred to as ‘mindfulness’. This472
terminology is widely accepted in the West, where473
the state of ‘mindfulness’ is defined as an opposite to474
‘mindlessness’, i.e. functioning on autopilot or sim-475
ply downloading mental models, assumptions and476
prejudices rather than witnessing present experience477
as it unfolds. Jon Kabat-Zinn provides an operational478
working definition of mindfulness as: ‘The awareness479
that emerges through paying attention on purpose,480
in the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the481
unfolding of experience moment by moment’ [10].482
It is important to clarify that our comprehension of483
mindfulness, as paying attention to experience as it484
unfolds, is not only connected to present moment sen-485
sations, but to accepting and witnessing our present486
moment experience, that may involve some or all487
aspects of experience, i.e. sensations, mental activity488
(thoughts, feelings, memory, intentions, beliefs, atti-489
tudes, etc.) and relational experience (connectedness490
to others, to our planet, to nature, etc.) [24].491
Daniel Siegel chooses to use the metaphor of492
the cameraman to explain two important aspects of493
awareness practices [24]. To capture a clear and accu-494
rate image, the cameraman needs to take care of:495
(1) opening the lens of the camera to allow for full496
view; and (2) stabilising the camera (using a tripod) to497
avoid blur in the image. Opening the lens of aware-498
ness requires attention to all aspects of experience:499
sensory perceptions, body awareness, awareness of500
mental activity such as thoughts, feelings, attitudes,501
beliefs, intentions, etc.; and, relational awareness of502
connectedness with others and with nature. However,503
the picture of reality will still be blurry if the observer504
fails to stabilise the camera of awareness. Stabilising505
the camera of awareness requires openness, obser-506
vation and objectivity. Siegel refers to these three507
fundamental components as the three legs of the tri-508
pod that stabilise the awareness lens (in his work509
Siegel uses the word mindsight instead of aware- 510
ness) [24]. When the lens of awareness is stabilised, 511
the details come into focus with more depth and 512
precision. Openness implies acceptance of what is, 513
without any preconceived ideas or attitudes of how 514
things ‘should be’, i.e. let go of expectations and 515
receive things as they are. Openness allows to recog- 516
nise restrictive judgements and release them from the 517
mind. Observation allows for a larger frame of refer- 518
ence of self-observation, i.e. to detach from habitual 519
responses and find a way to modify them. Objectivity 520
recognises that awareness is separate from what the 521
observer is aware of. 522
Siegel brings into focus five dimensions of aware- 523
ness: 1/ Awareness of sensory input (touch, smell, 524
sight, sound, taste); 2/ Internal body sensations of 525
comfort or discomfort; 3/ Mental activity (images, 526
beliefs, thoughts, feelings, attitudes); 4/ Relationship 527
with people, nature, artefacts; 5/ Awareness of aware- 528
ness. The five dimensions constitute a structure for 529
managing awareness and attention [24]. 530
Research from neurobiology [6, 13, 18, 25, 30, 31] 531
provides evidence that awareness development prac- 532
tices are correlated with the development of the 533
pre-frontal cortex of the brain, vertical (gut, heart and 534
cortex) and horizontal (left, right brain hemisphere) 535
integration of the brain and the development of 536
qualities of: Emotional balance and modulation of 537
fear; Response flexibility – pause before you act; 538
Insight – linking past with present experience and 539
future possibility; Empathy and compassion for 540
ourselves and others; Morality – what is appropriate 541
from the perspective of the common good; Intuition 542
- non rational way of wisdom and knowing, and thus 543
with wellbeing. 544
Siegel [23, 24] relates the concept of wellbeing 545
with complexity. In his acronym FACES (Flexible, 546
Adaptive, Coherent, Energised and Stable), he refers 547
to the wellbeing of a system (in the physical, mental, 548
and/or societal domain) as the capability to function 549
as a complex adaptive system, i.e. exhibiting coherent 550
emergent behaviours in relation to changes in its envi- 551
ronment, as opposed to rigid or random responses. 552
6. Towards wellbeing informatics: 553
complexity, intentionality, awareness and 554
measurement 555
In science, the purpose of research is to develop 556
insight and to predict. Science has the element 557
of experimental falsifiability, which is lacking 558
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from traditional disciplines, making it flexible and559
open ended. Scientific enquiry requires measure-560
ment as its system of validation/falsifiability. What561
about measurement and prediction in the human562
domain?563
Humans and human organisations exhibit complex564
systems behaviour, producing emergent properties565
and processes (mind, culture, etc.). It is possible566
for a complex system to move towards an ordered567
system or a system exhibiting random behaviour,568
when constraints change. For a system, the ability569
to function in a complex way is needed for adap-570
tation and innovation and provides the underlying571
capability for survival, sustainability and health, in572
both individuals and organisations. What the theory573
of complex systems tells us is, that the very nature of574
the multiple interacting and continuously changing575
relationships and constraints of the system, prevent576
precise prediction over longer periods of time, render-577
ing the scientific approach of verification/falsification578
problematic. This has important implications for the579
measurement and comprehension of human systems.580
Measurement in human systems requires: describ-581
ing the system in real time, both its state of being582
in the now and its tendency and direction of possi-583
ble change [12]. As human systems are embodied584
and situated, measurements need to cross boundaries585
between the physical, mental and societal domains.586
What is to be measured, is the state of being of the587
system and the individuals comprising it, in real time,588
simultaneously in these different domains. Both first589
and third person accounts of the state of the system590
are important and in large human organisations a dis-591
tributed ethnography approach assists insight [26].592
What is important to comprehend and assess is the593
state of being in terms of complexity capability, i.e.594
capability for a coherent dynamic response to change,595
and the existence of an ecology capable of sustaining596
wellbeing.597
Measuring and monitoring for wellbeing, referred598
to in this article, as ‘wellbeing informatics’, requires:599
An approach which prioritises description over evalu-600
ation; An enquiry that crosses the boundaries between601
physical, mental and societal domains; Grounding in602
phenomenology and the ’act of becoming aware’.603
Psychophysiological measurement such as Heart604
Rate Variability provides a valuable link between605
the human actor and objective physiology [11, 18].606
Catalysing new knowledge requires new ways of607
engagement and experimentation. As Varela points608
out ‘behaviour is to a very large extent a modulator609
of perception’ [29].610
The term ‘wellbeing informatics’ is important as 611
it implies a tangible, evidence based approach to the 612
study and evaluation of human and systemic wellbe- 613
ing, using the tools provided by informatics to create 614
a framework within which one may consider the 615
interaction between humans and information along- 616
side the construction of interfaces, organisations, 617
technologies and systems. 618
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